Deputy to the Director of Central Intelligence
for Resource Management
Washington, D.C. 20505

19 December 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR: See Distribution

SUBJECT: Study of NFIP Support to Contingency Forces

Attached is the final version of the study conducted under the sponsorship of my staff on NFIP Support to Contingency Forces. Comments provided on earlier drafts were most helpful, and we have accommodated many of the suggested changes. The study and its recommendations have been used in assessing FY82 NFIP budget submissions, and we plan to continue monitoring initiatives in this area as part of the FY83 budget development. In this regard, more specific items will be included in the DCI's FY83-FY87 Fiscal Guidance.

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Attachment:
Final Report - NFIP Support
to Contingency Forces

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NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM SUPPORT TO CONTINGENCY FORCES (U)

FINAL REPORT

November 1980

Director of Central Intelligence
Resource Management Staff

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NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM SUPPORT TO CONTINGENCY FORCES (U)

FINAL REPORT

November 1980

WARNING

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

This study was conducted under the supervision of the Resource Management Staff (RMS) of the Director of Central Intelligence. The research and preparation of the report was accomplished under the direction of [redacted] of RMS, with the

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Chapter I

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This effort is an outgrowth of an earlier ICS/RMS study, Intelligence Support to Air-Land Forces. That study examined opportunities for improved intelligence support from national assets for air-land forces under two cases: U.S. involvement in (1) a NATO/Warsaw Pact conventional conflict and (2) contingency operations. It found that contingency operations as a class of scenarios offer considerable potential for National Foreign Intelligence Program (NFIP) support that is not being fully realized. Recent interest within the National Security Council (NSC), DoD, and the State Department in improving U.S. contingency force capabilities--particularly for the newly formed Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force (RDJTF)--and crises in Cuba, Nicaragua, Iran, and Afghanistan, underscore the importance of identifying means of improving NFIP support for contingency operations. (TS)

A. PURPOSE, SCOPE, AND APPROACH

The purpose of this study is to identify ways to improve NFIP support to tactical forces in planning and executing contingency operations. Examples of tactical units involved include those designated for contingency operations conducted by a joint task force (JTF), the XVIII Airborne Corps, a Marine Amphibious Brigade (MAB), or a Marine Amphibious Unit (MAU). Intelligence support encompasses tasking, collection, processing, production, and dissemination of the finished product. The approach of this study is to (1) establish representative information needs for contingency operations, (2) develop criteria for assessing the utility of the information to contingency force commanders, (3) identify problems encountered in satisfying these needs, and (4) propose alternative solutions to these problems. (U)

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B. CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS AND INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT

Contingency operations are defined here as the use or projected use of military force in a region with little U.S. military presence in peacetime to achieve quickly a limited politico-military objective. Contingency operations can range over a number of missions and a spectrum of conflict intensities from benign (a show of force, for example) to violent. Several characteristics of contingency operations distinguish them from conventional operations planned for a NATO environment. Characteristically, contingency operations are difficult to predict as to locale and mission. International crises usually build up over time and then either subside or become sufficiently destabilizing as to warrant troop alert and perhaps intervention. Less often, they demand immediate troop deployment. In any case, the contingency force must initiate steps on the assumption that it will engage, and a very rapid response will be required after a National Command Authorities (NCA) decision to intervene. The size of a contingency force will vary from a JTF--including ground, naval, and tactical air units--to a unit as small as an MAU. Usually it will be quite small relative to forces engaged in conventional conflict. Characteristically, contingencies occur in less developed regions of the world about which little of the information needed by intervention forces is available. In summary, contingencies typically present many uncertainties and provide little time for resolution. (U)

Since World War II, more than 200 crisis incidents have occurred of which a substantial number involved the movement or the preparation for deployment of U.S. forces. A representative list of contingencies and their locations is shown in Figure 1, Chapter II. (U)

For the purpose of this study, contingency operations can be described in terms of five distinct phases relating to the military functions that must be performed: Phase I, Peacetime, encompasses general planning for potential contingency operations. Phase II, Alert, covers preparation for deployment following a formal alert notice. Phase III, Enroute, covers the deployment of the force. Phase IV, Operations, encompasses force

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employment (i.e., the conduct of the mission), including the landing or assault. Phase V, Withdrawal, is the extraction of the forces from the area of operations. (U)

The organizational relationships of the Service participants in contingency operations, shown in Figure 2, Chapter II, undergo some changes as control of the contingency units is passed to different commands for execution of the mission. These changes affect the requesting and reporting chains for national systems support. (For the purpose of this study, national systems are defined as those collection, processing, dissemination, and production assets funded by the NFIP. In addition to the term national systems, other phrases such as national collection resources, national collection systems, national intelligence assets, NFIB systems, national sources, etc., have been used more or less interchangeably throughout the study. The governing factor in the usage of these terms is that they refer to projects and systems included within and funded by the NFIP. When collection assets are broadly addressed in this context, they include a wide variety of systems ([redacted] 25X1
25X1 [redacted] and not merely national collection systems.) (U)

The unique characteristics of contingency operations generate intelligence requirements, many time critical, that are amenable to satisfaction by national assets. Collection resources within the NFIP include those assets described above. NFIP production assets include, among others, DIA, CIA, and the delegated production efforts of the military Services. However, access to some of these assets by the contingency commander is limited (particularly during Phase I) to support planning, as is the routine collection coverage of likely contingency regions by national systems. The methods for accessing national assets are illustrated by selected examples shown in Figures 3 through 6 of Chapter II, and Annex 3. The organic assets generally available to a tactical force commander include ground, ship, and airborne systems. However, the unique characteristics of contingency operations may limit the initial availability of these systems to the force. The supplementary and complementary nature

of the two sources of intelligence support has been demonstrated to advantage in recent JCS- and Service-sponsored exercises. [redacted] 25X1

C. INFORMATION NEEDS

Information needs for contingency operations are similar to those that are important to any tactical operation. This study has grouped these needs into six broad categories of requirements: national political structure and threats to stability; military and para-military forces; terrain, geography, and hydrography; lines of communication; social and cultural environment; and climatology. The needs within each category have varying importance in different contingency phases, reflecting the differing intelligence requirements as the contingency progresses. Table 5, Chapter III, displays the information needs by phase. It is important to recognize that a decision to execute a contingency mission, based on faulty or incomplete information obtained during Phase I or II, could well foredoom the operation to failure despite superlative intelligence during Phases III through V. (U)

In addition to the phase-related variation of information needs, the criteria that the desired information must satisfy if it is to be useful to the tactical commander also change by phase. For example, consideration of needs criteria indicates which information is relatively static and well suited for data base storage and which information is more dynamic and likely to require ad hoc collection efforts to provide updates specific to the situation. The needs criteria are timeliness, age, breadth, and detail. Timeliness and age are expressed quantitatively as a range of acceptable time limits for each phase; breadth and detail are expressed qualitatively as a descriptive modifier for each phase. For example, the criteria for Phase IV are:

- Timeliness - near real time to 12 hours
- Age - near real time to 48 hours
- Breadth - moderate
- Detail - moderate to fine. (U)

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These criteria form the basis for assessing the capability of national assets to support contingency forces. (U)

Most of the information needs identified as critical in Phase I, but not satisfied during that phase, will remain critical in Phase II or any succeeding phase. This could have a serious limiting effect on Phase II collection as the unsatisfied Phase I needs compete for resources. (U)

D. PROBLEM AREAS

The major problem areas identified evolve from (a) an analysis that relates information needs to intelligence capabilities, (b) examination of intelligence problems found in past contingency operations, and (c) interviews with intelligence and operational personnel from the national level and tactical units in the field. (U)

The problems identified appear to fall into three fairly well defined categories. The first category comprises problems having to do with the emphasis accorded contingency areas for the collection and production of information by national assets; as such they include considerations that appear amenable to resolution by actions that can be taken primarily at the national level. The second category comprises problems of requesting and receiving information from the national systems and linguistic support; resolution of these problems will require action by the national intelligence community, JCS, U&S commands, and the Services. The third category comprises problems that arise primarily from limitations of the Services in using information from national sources. (U)

1. Problem Area 1

In the first category, the major problems stem from both collection and production shortcomings. Geographic access limitations and the higher priorities accorded surveillance of the Soviet Union, other Warsaw Pact countries, and China limit the availability of satellite systems for routine collection against third world countries to support contingency planning. Once a crisis arises, some of the satellites have flexibility for

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responding in selected areas, at the expense of routine coverage and with the delays inherent in developing familiarity with a new collection environment. The limitations on national airbreathing platforms for use in contingencies are associated with time-consuming logistic support and with political constraints posed by overflight and basing rights that degrade the capability to respond rapidly as required in Phases II through IV. Many of the [redacted] and much of the airspace in which overhead assets are deployed, are geographically disposed toward the Eurasian land mass. Although there are many [redacted] In addition, the lack of routine [redacted] of areas of potential contingency action reduces the value of the [redacted] data bases, which cannot be constructed quickly in response to crisis needs. Of course, even the redirection of [redacted] assets in a crisis raises resource tradeoffs that are not easily resolved. [redacted]

Among the production problems, inadequate third world data to support contingency force planning efforts is among the most severe. The considerable importance that tactical users attach to the need for a comprehensive data base is not universally shared in the national intelligence community, some members of which feel that ad hoc collection in a crisis will supplant much of the information previously collected. However, while some of the ad hoc Phase II requirements for fresh collection overlap Phase I needs, the majority of Phase II needs are new or different types of requirements that complement Phase I needs. The dissemination of data base information to the tactical user in Phase II is often hampered by delays and miscommunications resulting from physical transfer required in the absence of equipments for electrical transfer. (U)

Low priorities have often prevented tactical units from obtaining updated information needed in peacetime or in a mounting crisis for contingency planning. (U)

The demise of the CIA National Intelligence Surveys (NIS) in 1973 has left tactical units without what were very popular compendia of information on the countries of the world that were useful for planning. Other survey

documents such as the Army's area handbooks and DIA's Integrated Operations Support Studies (IOSSs) are helpful, but do not provide the breadth of content of the NIS. (U)

2. Problem Area 2

The second category of problems is generally related to shortcomings in requesting and receiving information resulting from faulty or misunderstood procedures, inadequate tactical communications equipment, and lack of tailored reporting. (U)

The multiplicity of channels and nodes, particularly within DoD, for requesting intelligence support from the national agencies causes confusion at the tactical level. The complexity of the intelligence support problem stems in part from the nature of the command and control systems. This difficulty is especially acute with contingency forces because of the changes in chains of command typical of contingency operations. The lack of a single node for satisfaction of requests creates some uncertainty for the requester and makes it difficult to establish an audit trail. Although the DIA Collection Coordination Facility (CCF) can act on requests for collection in all disciplines, it processes only those that are time sensitive. The procedures for contacting in-country HUMINT assets are even less well understood. Although HUMINT assets have proved invaluable in a number of contingency operations, some tactical personnel state that they do not know if they are receiving all available information from these assets because of the ORCON caveat. However, DIA and CIA have taken steps to alleviate this problem, especially as it applies at the U&S command level. In brief, military personnel at the operational levels question the ability of the national level to respond to requests for support during both the planning for and execution of contingency operations. (S)

Existing communications equipments at the tactical level are not fully capable of handling the message volume generated by reports available from the national systems. At the present time, adequate communications are not provided airborne contingency forces enroute to the objective area. Lastly, during the initial portions of the operational phase, connectivity

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between the contingency force and national sources is based on high frequency (HF) or very high frequency (VHF) links, which, though capable of being secured, are limited in capacity. (S)

Problems associated with reporting from the national level include difficulties in culling out the relevant information from what often is a large mass of data. NSA and the National Photographic Interpretation Center (NPIC) do provide some tailored reporting, and DIA is now providing some report profiling capability in the Advanced Imagery Requirements and Exploitation System (AIRES). (S)

The limited number of SI/TK billets in tactical forces has resulted in the failure of key operational personnel to receive required information. While clearance restrictions might be waived in a crisis, many operational personnel will have inadequate experience in dealing with such intelligence products. The APEX program now under development may resolve this problem; however, the fact that some of the physical parameters of the collection sources will be even more tightly controlled under APEX may reduce the value of the program. (S)

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3. Problem Area 3

The third category of problems is related to difficulties encountered by the Services in their efforts to utilize the information from national systems. Basically, the difficulties appear to stem from an inability to assimilate and fuse the information made available. While exercises have shown the advantages of computer processing support, the availability of such equipments, at least in the early stages of the operational phase of a contingency mission, is questionable. (U)

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E. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The conclusions and recommendations presented in Chapter V address the major shortfalls, identified during the course of the study, in the ability of the NFIP agencies to provide intelligence support to contingency forces. While none of the recommendations offer immediate solutions to the problems described, they do address actions that the DCI and other members of the intelligence community should initiate now and that will, in the longer term, result in significant improvements in NFIP capabilities for contingency support. (U)

The recommendations are organized under the general headings of Production, Collection, Requesting and Receiving Information, Linguists, Using the Information, Enroute Communications, and Final Observation. The recommendations are based on program initiatives identified by the NFIP Program Managers as well as judgments concerning new initiatives that should be undertaken. While each of the recommendations is written so as to stand alone, the efficacy of some would be heightened if they are considered as a group. For example, the recommendations under the heading of Production follow a logical sequence: (1) identify generic information needs; (2) identify critical geographic areas; (3) based on those information needs for those areas, determine data base gaps and weaknesses; and (4) increase the priority for filling the gaps. (U)

The following table provides a summary of the recommendations and indicates the participating organizations. Details and responsibilities for implementation are explained in Chapter V. (U)

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Chapter II

BACKGROUND

For the last few years all levels of command have indicated concern over the ability of the United States to respond to crisis situations. As a result of that concern, attention has recently been focused on what can be done to improve the means for applying military force in regions with little or no U.S. military presence to rapidly achieve limited objectives. While actions such as the establishment of the Rapid Deployment Force (RDF) and the forward deployment of Marine Amphibious Units (MAU) may provide significant improvements in the ability of the U.S. to mount contingency operations, their effectiveness would be degraded if timely intelligence support is not available. Although recent events in the Middle East, Africa, and Central America have served to highlight the difficulties that may be expected in providing information on third world areas, additional emphasis is required if the full potential of the contingency forces is to be realized. (U)

This effort is an outgrowth of an earlier ICS/RMS study, Intelligence Support to Air-Land Forces. That study examined opportunities for improved intelligence support from national assets for air-land forces under two cases--U.S. involvement in a NATO/Warsaw Pact conventional conflict and in contingency operations. It found that contingency operations as a class of scenarios offer considerable potential for National Foreign Intelligence Program (NFIP) support that is not being fully realized. (TS)

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A. PURPOSE, SCOPE, AND APPROACH

The purpose of this study is to identify ways to improve NFIP support to tactical forces for planning and conducting contingency operations. Examples of tactical units involved include those designated for contingency operations under command of the XVIII Airborne Corps, a Marine Amphibious Brigade (MAB), or a Marine Amphibious Unit (MAU). Intelligence support encompasses the entire chain from tasking through collection, processing, production, and dissemination of the finished product. The general approach to the study is to derive a set of information needs critical to contingency operations. Then, based on (1) the results of an examination of recent contingency operations, (2) interviews with users and intelligence personnel of the four military services and the national intelligence agencies, and (3) the unique capabilities and limitations of NFIP systems, the problems that might be encountered in satisfying these needs are analyzed. However, information on actual utilization of national assets for intelligence support of tactical forces has been difficult to obtain. Most of the data available to this study effort have resulted from exercises and from a very scant number of actual or anticipated contingency operations. Moreover, data on intelligence support of past contingencies, for the most part, have not provided references to the specific information needs sought by the tactical forces, nor the responses provided them. Some after action and lessons learned reports from past contingency operations have commented on specific shortfalls in intelligence support in general. (Interestingly, some of the so-called post mortems of past operations had no references to intelligence subjects.) Thus, this effort has had to rely on (a) a very limited amount of information regarding actual national source intelligence support to operations, (b) exercise data, (c) intelligence gaps cited in past contingency operations, (d) interviews, and (e) the analysis that matched known information needs against national collection and production systems. (U)

B. CHARACTERISTICS OF CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS

In a broad sense, any exertion of an influencing force to shape the outcome of an international action, dispute, or argument; to provide relief; or to protect one's own interests abroad, could be interpreted as an intervention action and a possible forerunner to a contingency operation. Several related reasons appear to underlie a renewed interest in contingency operations and forces. Foremost among these are the recent events in Iran, Afghanistan, and Nicaragua. In a broader sense, however, the interest has been generated in part by the growth in the number of independent nations and the attendant decline in the influence of the major powers in these areas. The third world countries are becoming increasingly dissatisfied and strident over their underprivileged status. This attitude has led to adventuristic actions, such as taking hostages and endangering the citizens and property of other countries, including those of the free world. Moreover, the economies of free world countries are becoming increasingly vulnerable because of their dependence on third world resources, especially oil. Continued acts of terrorism by minority groups and political extremists place the free world governments in the difficult position of having to trade off protection of their own citizens against compromises in foreign policy and, by inference, an invitation to further terrorist acts. All of these considerations are magnified by the increasing willingness and capability of the Soviet Union both to encourage wars of liberation and to intervene beyond their borders either directly or through surrogate forces. (U)

Contingency operations can range over a number of missions and over a spectrum of conflict intensities from benign to violent. Examples of the kinds of operations involved include: (U)

- Making a show of force or presence to demonstrate resolve
- Meeting direct threat to U.S. or allied interests
- Evacuating endangered U.S. or allied personnel
- Protecting threatened U.S. or allied property
- Augmenting client country's fighting force
- Invading or retaking defeated client area. (U)

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A variety of pressures for the employment of contingency forces have been and will continue to be with us. We have alerted and deployed contingency forces in reacting to external threats, retrieving our citizens from threatened areas abroad, protecting U.S. property in other countries, and supporting allies in crises. However, a number of more subtle pressures for deployment of U.S. forces abroad are prevalent to varying degrees in our own society. The wish to preserve and demonstrate our national prestige and avoid international humiliation has been a strong, intangible feeling among Americans. Special interest groups can bring pressure on the government to intercede in the interests of certain nation states. The perceived need for intervention may arise out of problems related to the political-military balance or for the protection of vital resources. (U)

A variety of constraints against the deployment of contingency forces are also operative. Potential consequences and risks from force deployment include retaliatory intervention by other countries, the possibility of a direct confrontation with Soviet forces, the provocation by overflight, adverse perceptions of allies, economic sanctions against the United States, the loss of political status, weakening of the U.S. deterrent through drawdown of stockpiles or maldeployment of forces, domestic neoisolationist pressures, or dependence on allied or neutral nations for bases and overflight rights. (U)

Since World War II, something over 200 incidents have occurred abroad in which U.S. military forces were utilized to meet foreign policy objectives. Most of these instances consisted of the movement of a military unit to or near a particular area for the purpose of demonstrating interest or presence on our part. Table 1 presents a list of crises representative of situations that portended U.S. contingency involvement. This table indicates for each selected crisis the type of mission involved and the nature of U.S. involvement. The latter is categorized as (a) anticipated an alert, (b) alerted, (c) deployed to the vicinity of the incident, or (d) engaged in a combat or noncombat operation (i.e., evacuation of personnel or protection of U.S. or allied property). In most cases the tactical commander had to be prepared for combat. Since a major focus of this paper

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TABLE 1. UNCLASSIFIED
(U) SELECTED CONTINGENCIES

Event		Type of Mission						Involvement			
		Show of Force	Meet Direct Threat	Rescue/ Evacuate Personnel	Protect Personnel & Property	Augment Client Fighting Force	Retake Client Area	Anticipated An Alert	Alerted	Deployed to Operational Area	Engaged*
Berlin Airlift	1948	X	X						X	X	X
North Korean Invasion of South Korea**	1950		X			X			X	X	X
Venezuela Incident	1958	X							X		
Support During Political Crisis in Lebanon	1958					X		X	X	X	X
Security of Berlin	1959, 1961		X					X	X	X	
Bay of Pigs Operation	1961						X	X	X	X	
Soviet Missiles Observed in Cuba	1962		X					X	X	X	
Laos/ Thailand	1962	X				X		X	X	X	
Protection of Panama Canal Zone	1964				X				X		X
Rescue of Hostages in Stanleyville, Congo	1964			X				X	X	X	X
Viet Cong Attacks in South Vietnam	1964					X			X	X	X
Civil War in Dominican Republic	1965					X		X	X	X	X
Arab-Israeli War	1967	X							X		
Pueblo Seized by North Korea	1968	X							X	X	
U.S. EC-121 Shot Down	1969	X							X	X	
Civil War in Jordan	1970	X						X	X		
India-Pakistan War-- Bangladesh	1971	X						X	X	X	
Arab-Israeli War	1973	X						?	X	X	
Rescue of U.S. Personnel from Mayaguez	1975			X					X	X	X
Attack on U.S. Personnel in Korean DMZ	1976	X						X	X	X	
Rescue of Hostages from Zaire	1978			X				X	X	X	X
Soviet Combat Troops Observed in Cuba	1979	X						X	X	X	
Revolt Against Somoza in Nicaragua	1979	X						X	?	X	X
Takeover of U.S. Embassy in Iran	1979	X						X	X	X	
Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan	1979	X							X	X	
Internal Conflict in El Salvador	1979	X						X	?		
Attempted Rescue-- Iran***	1980			X				X	X	X	

* Engaged includes combat and noncombat operations such as evacuation of personnel and protection of U.S. or Allied property.
** At the outset, this incident presented features of a contingency operation.
*** Security reasons and timing have precluded examination of intelligence support to this incident.

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is on enhancing the effectiveness of intelligence support for the tactical commander in planning contingency operations, even those cases in which no deployment occurred are important, for they can provide insight into the types of intelligence needed. Annex 1 contains a brief narrative of some of these contingency operations. (U)

Figure 1 shows the geographic distribution of these representative crises. Except for Berlin, these incidents took place in clusters in the Middle East and contiguous countries, sub-Saharan Africa, the Caribbean-Latin American region, Asia, and Southeast Asia. Most of these incidents occurred in third world countries. About one-third occurred in cities. (U)

A detailed listing of international crises events occurring between 1961 and 1975 was compiled and analyzed by DIA, based on a COMIREX study of 1971. This analysis substantiates the observations made above and also provides data that underscore the importance and prevalence of crises that could carry into contingency operations. (The DIA study defines an international crisis event as one in which U.S. interests are in jeopardy, are thought to be in jeopardy, or could be jeopardized.) The data show that: (U)

- The number of crises ranged from 1 to 12 per year.
- At least 5 crises occurred in each of 10 of the 15 years.
- The mean number of crises was 5.6 per year.
- The mean frequency of occurrence of simultaneous crises was 5 per year. (U)

The study separated each event into three phases--buildup, critical, and subsidence. It found that, with respect to the critical phase: (U)

- The average duration was 30 days.
- The mean number of days involved per year was 172.
- The mean frequency of simultaneous occurrence was 3 per year. (U)

The analysis noted the trends are toward fewer direct confrontations between the United States and the Soviet Union, an increase in civil disorders and coups, and a gradual geographic shift to the south. These trends are true of the list in Table 1. (U)

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

FIGURE 1. UNCLASSIFIED
(U) LOCATIONS OF REPRESENTATIVE CONTINGENCIES

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Characteristically, most contingency operations are the result of problems of sovereignty. The incidents in Table 1, for example, were the outgrowth of communist tendencies to nurture domestic and international violence abroad, attempts at secession and the annexation of territory, difficulties bordering on or moving into civil war and right of self-determination, acts of violence by radical political groups, and the relief steps in the aftermath of social breakdown of a dissident and estranged group. The fact that so many contingencies occur in third world countries amplifies the complexities and the importance of the socio-political environment. Typically, the populations of these economically underdeveloped countries are conglomerates of political, social, and religious groups, many of which have the support of outside anti-U.S. interests. (U)

Most contingency operations are typified by limited political-military objectives, limited force size, a rather limited duration (at least in intention), the need for rapid deployment, and not infrequently an agonized decisionmaking process leading to the determination to deploy. (U)

All of the above characteristics influence the military nature of the operation, imposing as they do particular constraints and pressures on the forces, which in turn place particular importance on the intelligence required. Perhaps the foremost problem is the paucity of intelligence on the socio-political structure; the terrain; the ports of entry; the lines of communication (LOC); the availability of water, petroleum, oil, and lubricants (POL), and other resources; the medical facilities; the military capabilities and order of battle of the indigenous forces; and the location of U.S. and allied citizens. Because many contingencies occur in cities, the structure and peculiarities of conducting operations in urban areas place an added need on the requisite intelligence support. (U)

Lastly, contingency operations are so intertwined with foreign policy considerations that considerable uncertainty--perhaps anxiety--surrounds the decision to embark on the operation. Consequently, except in the most clearly discerned, direct open threat to U.S. interests, the decisionmaking process preceding deployment must be extended while the possible allied and

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